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1. Introduction 
 
Competition Authorities are imposing many so-called informational remedies, 
to encourage consumers to be more active in markets by searching between 
alternative offerings and switching suppliers when this is advantageous to 
them (Garrod et al, 2008).  For example, in each one of the six market 
inquiries concerned with final consumer markets which the UK Competition 
Commission concluded between 2003 and 2007, informational remedies have 
been applied, even where the main ‘Adverse Effect on Competition’ was cited 
on the supply side.  In two cases the Commission explicitly rejected a price 
cap, sometimes seen as a regulator’s first defence against excessive prices 
caused by market dominance, in favour of such remedies.  These usually take 
the form of providing more information to consumers at the time of purchase, 
often in narrowly prescribed formats;1 the creation of more options or time in 
which consumers can change their minds or choose alternatives;2 or removal 
of actual or perceived barriers to switching.3  Where switching barriers were 
addressed, provision of consumer information was also an important aspect of 
the remedy package.  
 
Such remedies are posited on the assumption that consumers will react by 
becoming more active as they are provided with more information, given more 
time to digest such details and to revisit their original purchase decision, and 
the barriers to switching are reduced.  The success of such interventions is 
posited on an implicit assumption that consumer activity in markets reflects an 
underlying model of utility maximisation.  But a growing strand of economic 
theory and accumulating empirical evidence suggest that consumer behaviour 
is much more complex than such a model suggests.  If purchasers do not 
respond in the way which the classic economic model suggests, such 
remedies may be ineffective or, worse, could have perverse consequences 
and make the situation worse than before the remedy was imposed. For 
example, if giving consumers more time to investigate alternatives leads them 
to undertake a purchase on the basis that they (wrongly) expect to revisit the 
decision, but in practice they do not do so, it may lead to greater market power 
for firms (Silk, 2006).  Similarly if consumers do not respond to reduced search 
and switching costs by increasing activity, but these remedies increase 
confidence that markets are working well, firms may be able to exercise 
greater market power (Waterson, 2003).  Since most such remedies are costly 
to implement, at best they are likely to drive prices upward if they have no 
beneficial consequences.  
 
In contrast, if consumers do behave as predicted by a traditional model of 
utility maximisation, they can indeed play an important role in supporting 
efficient markets.  If consumers can compare alternative deals and select the 
one which best suits their needs, they provide a powerful incentive for firms to 
compete effectively.  Socially damaging market power can result when 
consumers do not do so, either because they do not conform to the ‘utility 
maximising’ model, or because they are unaware of the possibility of choosing 
                                                 
1
 Veterinary Medicines, CC 2003a; Store Cards, CC, 2006a; Home Credit, CC, 2006c. 
2
 Extended Warranties, CC 2003b. 
3
 Liquefied Petroleum Gas, CC, 2006b; Northern Irish Personal Bankin, CC, 2007. 
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between alternative suppliers, when consumers face difficulty in identifying 
suppliers’ product-price offerings (high search costs) or when consumers find it 
costly to change between different firms (high switching costs). 4  
Understanding exactly how consumer ability is impaired is vital for 
policymakers in several regards. Firstly, the optimal policy response may differ 
substantially between different types of problems. Improving consumers’ 
access to information to reduce search costs and to improve awareness is 
quite different from reducing switching costs by, for example, ensuring that 
consumers can open and close new bank accounts and change direct debit 
arrangements quickly and easily. Secondly, policy may need to be targeted to 
specific groups of consumers if certain consumer groups are more impaired 
than others or if certain groups play a more important role in the market than 
others. Finally, the problems may only exist in certain types of markets and so 
it is useful to know how these decisions vary in different markets.  Evidence 
presented in this paper can improve current policy advice on these issues by 
separately identifying the effect of expected search and switching costs on the 
behaviour of a sample of consumers across eight regulated and newly 
deregulated markets in the UK.  The form and institutional arrangements for 
regulatory oversight vary considerably between the sectors examined, and our 
analysis provides a new perspective on such differences. 
 
We examine the way in which consumers react to expectations about potential 
gain from switching supplier, and how long they anticipate it will take them to 
search for a better deal and to make the switch once the decision to change 
has been made and the new supplier identified, so that we can explore how far 
consumers do indeed seem to follow a utility maximising model, based on their 
own estimates of the potential gains and costs involved in searching. 
 
In the next section we review the literatures on relevant recent developments 
in behavioural economics and on searching and switching behaviour.  The 
model motivation and econometric method are described in section 3, and the 
survey and data in section 4.  Section 5 presents and assesses the results, 
and section 6 draws policy lessons and concludes.  
 
 
2. Literature 
There has been increasing interest in the extent to which consumers’ decisions 
conform to a model of a ‘rational’ economic agent, and the implications for 
competition policy, and we discuss this literature before reviewing previous 
empirical studies on search and switching costs.  Rotemberg (2008) presents 
evidence that consumers have poor knowledge and awareness of prices, are 
often motivated by regret related to their own choices and anger at perceived 
unfairness in market opportunities, and have difficulty in choosing the best deal 
from a menu of price choices.  Several papers provide empirical evidence of 
consumers failing to choose the best deal for themselves from a menu of 
tariffs, either provided by a single supplier or by competitors (Economides et 
al., 2006 and Miravete, 2003 for US telecoms; Agarwak et al (2006) for US 
                                                 
4
 See Baye et al (2006) for a review of the potentially anti-competitive effects of search costs, and Farrell 
and Klemperer (2006) for switching costs. Wilson (2006) considers the effects of the two costs when 
consumers may face both costs. 
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credit cards; Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) for German internet provision; 
Wilson and Waddams Price (2007) for UK electricity consumers).   
 
There are two underlying explanations for such findings.  One is that 
consumers have a stable set of preferences, and they are maximising utility 
subject to their cognitive and time limitations; i.e. they are operating subject to 
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1991; Ellison, 2005).  The second explanation, 
both for errors observed in the market place, and of apparently non rational 
findings from the experimental literature, is that a model of utility maximisation 
is fundamentally inappropriate for consumer choice (DellaVigna, 2007).  
Behaviour based either on bounded rationality or on an objective other than 
maximisation of utility functions has important implications for appropriate 
policy interventions. 
 
Turning to more specific analysis of search and switching activity, two distinct 
streams of literature have focused on the effects of either search or switching 
costs in isolation, with a small set of papers considering both. Wilson (2006) 
suggests that before starting their search, consumers will be more deterred by 
expected search costs than anticipated switching costs, because any 
investigation involves search costs for certain, but switching costs would be 
incurred only if a better deal is discovered.  Alternatively consumers might find 
the psychological costs of the switching decision more onerous that those of 
uncommitted searching.   
 
Investigations into search behaviour for new products suggest that most 
consumers search surprisingly little. Individual level studies suggest, for 
example, that consumers search an average of 1.2 or 1.3 internet sites when 
considering buying a book or CD (Johnson et al, 2004) or approximately three 
dealers when looking for a new car (Moorthy et al, 1997). Recent work 
combines market level data with restrictions from theoretical models to recover 
estimates of the market distribution of search costs (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 
2004; Hong and Shum, 2006). In the online market for memory chips, Moraga-
González and Wildenbeest (2006) estimate that around 20-30% consumers 
search only once, 60-70% search two or three times and only 10% search all 
alternatives. 
 
The empirical effects of switching costs have been analysed in many settings, 
as reviewed by Farrell and Klemperer (2006). Typically, individual level 
analyses find that consumer demographics, often used as proxies for search 
and switching costs, explain little of observed switching activity (Chen and Hitt, 
2002; Kiser, 2002) and that switching costs can vary between firms, a 
conclusion confirmed from studies using market level data (Shy, 2002; Kim et 
al, 2003). 
 
Most of the studies which consider both search and switching costs use survey 
level data to investigate consumers’ decisions and the relative effects of 
search and switching costs.5  Typically, the decision to switch suppliers is 
                                                 
5
 In contrast, Moshkin and Shachar (2002) introduce and implement a methodology to identify how 
consumers are relatively constrained by the two costs. With only the use of panel dataset of US television 
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estimated as a function of the gains available from doing so (objectively 
calculated from the researchers’ information about opportunities in the market); 
and a set of demographic and individual variables to proxy search and 
switching costs.  Giulietti et al (2005) find that switching cost proxies appear to 
be the most influential factor in the decision to change suppliers for over 700 
consumers in the UK gas market. While employing measures for the monetary 
gains available to each consumer from switching, and controlling for the 
possibility that some consumers were not aware of the option to switch, they 
find that the effects of consumers’ expectations of both the time it would take 
to switch and of the difficulty of switching were greater than the effects of 
search cost proxies or demographic variables.  
 
Pomp et al (2005) utilise a similar methodology across a series of nine 
different product markets in Holland. Their approach enables comparison of 
switching behaviour across markets while allowing for unobserved consumer 
effects, but is limited in that the controls for the gains available extend only to a 
measure of whether each consumer considered the gains to be high or not. 
They find that search cost factors appear to be insignificant in the decision to 
switch. While these two studies are useful, their results are restricted by the 
inability to separate the decision to search from the decision to switch. In 
contrast, Sturluson (2003) suggests the probability of switching is over four 
times higher for those consumers who have actively searched.  Unlike Giulietti 
et al (2005), he finds that search costs exert a much larger effect than 
switching costs. However, this study is limited by the methodology used to 
construct a measure of consumers’ expectations of the savings available from 
switching. 
 
This paper provides an opportunity to assess the underlying model assumption 
of consumer rationality (even if bounded) as a basis for policy intervention.  In 
this sense it draws on the strengths of preceding empirical work to provide a 
more detailed approach to consumer search and switching behaviour. To aid 
policymakers in understanding whether they should focus on attempts to 
reduce search or switching costs, like Sturluson (2002), the data allows us to 
identify separately the effect of expected time to search and switch. Secondly, 
in order to help target policy at specific types of consumers and markets, like 
Pomp et al (2005), we can compare behaviours and decisions of the same 
group of consumers across a range of different markets. In particular, by using 
direct estimates of consumers’ expectations for both gains and, separately, for 
search and switching, we are able to model each decision in terms of 
anticipated benefits and costs more directly than in most previous attempts. 
This enables us to identify the extent to which such actions reflect an 
underlying utility maximisation model; and the effect of market and consumer 
characteristics separately from their role as proxies for anticipated gains and 
costs.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
viewers’ choices they show that 71% of consumers’ behaviour is more consistent with the existence of 
search costs. 
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3. The Model, Data and Modelling 
In this section we first describe the motivation for the model we use, and then 
the econometric methodology.  
 
3.1 Motivation for Model 
Consumers maximising utility in a classic economic model would increase 
search and switching activity as anticipated monetary gains rose and the 
expected hours needed for searching and switching fell.  The value of both the 
monetary gains and the cost of the time vary between consumers according to 
their circumstances, in particular their income.  Respondents with higher 
income would be less likely to switch for given expected gains and anticipated 
time for two reasons.  The value of the monetary gain to them would be less: 
and the opportunity cost of their time would be greater, raising the disincentive 
effect of the activity; the influence of more education (which is closely 
correlated with income) on the length of time taken itself should be captured in 
the direct measures of expected time.  Other demographic variables which 
might affect the trade-off between expected gains and costs include age and 
gender, either for intrinsic reasons or as a result of targeting by firms (Giulietti 
et al., 2005); and consumers to whom quality is an important consideration 
may be less likely to switch to suppliers whose quality is unknown.   
 
Consumers’ willingness to search and switch will also depend on how 
confident they are in their estimates of the potential gains and costs, with a 
greater willingness to act (for given central expectations of gain and pain) the 
less variation they perceive there to be around their central estimate.  This 
variance is likely to be lower if they have experience of switching in other 
markets.  Similarly general knowledge about which markets are competitive 
may increase confidence and the probability of searching and switching.   
 
Applying a utility maximisation model, once consumers are aware of the 
possibility of choosing between alternatives, they face a two-stage choice 
problem: firstly whether or not to search; and secondly, depending on the 
information obtained during such search, whether or not to switch.   
Our model for consumers who are aware of the possibility of choice in any 
market can therefore be described as a two-stage model in which the 
propensity to search is given by 
 
P(se) = a(expected gain, anticipated search costs, anticipated switching costs, 
income, age, gender, supplier expected to match, important to trust supplier, 
switching in other markets, general market knowledge)   
      (1) 
 
And to switch by   
 
P(sw) = b(expected gain, anticipated switching costs, income, age, gender, 
supplier expected to match, important to trust supplier, switching in other 
markets, general market knowledge)       (2) 
 
A consumer’s attitude to search and switching, and to the potential gains 
available, might vary between markets for several reasons.  The searching and 
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switching process may be less psychologically onerous for some products than 
for others, independently of the time consumers expect to spend; potential 
gains which are a very small proportion of expenditure may be regarded as 
less motivating than where gains represent a large share of the bill; and there 
may be more knowledge about some markets than others, for example 
because of advertising or information campaigns, so that consumers are more 
confident in their estimates.  We therefore expect that the relationships in 
equations (1) and (2) might vary between markets.   
 
3.2 Econometric Model 
In modelling consumer switching, based on consumer utility, we follow the 
indirect utility function approach of Giulietti et al. (2005).  However unlike 
Giulietti et al we do not model awareness of choice as part of the process, 
since the markets had all been open for several years when the survey was 
administered, and general awareness was high.  Rather, we restrict the 
analysis to those consumers who were aware of choice in each market.  Given 
that the default position is that consumers stay with their current supplier 
unless the expected benefit from switching exceeds the costs which they 
expect to incur in searching for a better deal and making the switch, we view a 
consumer’s change of supplier as a two-stage process, encompassing firstly 
search, and secondly switching.  We analyse this process in the eight markets, 
( 8k = ), listed in the next section, by modelling the decision of a consumer to 
search and switch as a two-stage decision. The underlying process of search 
and switching decisions is represented by the latent variable model described 
in the following relationships, 
  
*
1 1 1 1ik ik iky X β ε′= +  (1) 
*
2 2 2 2ik ik iky X β ε′= +  (2) 
 
where ik  indicates the ith consumer in the kth market, the subscript 1 relates 
to the search decision and the subscript 2 to the switching decision. The error 
terms, 1 2 and ik ikε ε  are assumed to be normally distributed but not necessarily 
independent of each other. The column vector 1ikX in equation (1) identifies the 
set of factors affecting the search decision and the vector 2ikX in equation (2) 
represents factors affecting the decision to change supplier.  Since the two 
decisions are believed to be closely correlated, the initial model included the 
same set of variables as factors which would potentially affect search and 
switching decisions. The model was subsequently reduced to one with a 
smaller number of interaction terms by the general-to-specific approach using 
the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) for model selection. The model 
selection process and the AIC test summary are shown in Tables A2 and A3 in 
the appendix.    
 
Consumers who have searched are observed as *1 11 if 0ik iky y= > , and those 
who have switched suppliers are observed as *2 21 if 0ik iky y= > . We analyse the 
search and switching decision process using a bivariate probit model, allowing 
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some degree of correlation between the unobserved factors affecting the two-
stages of the decision captured in 1 2 and ik ikε ε .  
 
The likelihood function of this bivariate probit model (Greene 2002) is: 
 
 
( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )}
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1
ln , , ln , ;
                           1 ln , ;
                           1 ln
ik ik ik ik
i k
ik ik ik ik ik
ik ik
L y y F X X
y y X F X X
y X
β β ρ β β ρ
β β β ρ
β
=
+ − Φ −  
+ − Φ −
∑∑
 
(3) 
 
 
The joint probability that individual i in the kth market searches between 
alternative suppliers and switches to another supplier is  
 
 
( ) ( )1 2 2 1 21, 1 , ,ik ik ik ikP y y X Xβ β ρ′ ′= = = Φ  (4) 
 
where 2Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate standard 
normal and ρ indicates the degree of correlation between the error terms 
1 2 and ik ikε ε . The unconditional probability that a consumer will search is: 
( ) ( )1 11ik ikP y X β′= = Φ  (5) 
 
The marginal effects of different factors on the probability of searching and 
switching supplier are calculated based on the probability of changing supplier, 
conditional on having searched around for alternative suppliers.  
  
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 1 2 11 1 , , /ik ik ik ik ikP y y X X Xβ β ρ β′ ′ ′= = = Φ Φ  (6) 
 
Although we obtain the marginal effects of each factor only for those who have 
both searched and switched supplier, ( )2 11 1ik ikP y y= = , probabilities of other 
combinations are predicted from the estimation, viz.: not searching and 
switching ( )2 11 0ik ikP y y= = ;  searching but not switching ( )2 10 1ik ikP y y= = ; 
and neither searching nor switching ( )2 10 0ik ikP y y= = .  
 
 
4. The Survey and the Data 
The data we use are from a specially commissioned large scale survey 
administered in the summer of 2005.  The survey was conducted by Market 
and Opinion Research International and carried out among a nationally 
representative sample of 2027 adults aged 16 or over, interviewed face-to-
face, in-home, in 167 sampling points across Great Britain (i.e. excluding 
Northern Ireland).  The survey used quota sampling which followed the 
Government Office Region's set quota on demographics (age, gender, class 
etc.). 
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Respondents were asked which products the household consumed and paid 
for, from a list comprising gas, electricity, mobile phone, fixed phone line 
rental, national and overseas calls, broadband internet, house contents 
insurance, car insurance, mortgage, current bank account and piped water 
supply. These markets are similar in that they all require a ‘relationship’ 
between supplier and consumers which the consumer needs to sever in order 
to switch to an alternative provider. But they differ in the degree of 
homogeneity of the product and the nature of regulatory oversight, the 
transparency of pricing structures and the information that consumers are 
likely to have about the charges levied by their own suppliers and others. 
Respondents were then asked whether they had a choice of supplier for each 
product in their region, to test their awareness of competition in the market.  
Virtually all respondents had a choice for all products, except for water, where 
no choice was available.  Respondents were selected if they were aware that 
choice was available in the relevant market and were solely or jointly 
responsible for making decisions on who supplied that product. 
 
Further questions were asked about all these markets except water, gas and 
house contents insurance.  In particular, for our purposes, respondents were 
asked whether they had searched around for better deals and whether they 
had switched supplier in each market during the previous three years (other 
than when moving house). They were also asked how long such search and 
switching had taken, or how long they would expect it to take.  Questions were 
also asked about how much they thought they could save in each market if 
they shopped around.  The questions posed and the construction of the 
variables are reproduced in the appendix.   
 
To reduce attrition, years of education were used as a proxy for income.6  We 
would expect that more education would reduce the probability of switching for 
given monetary gain and time estimates.  The direct estimates of anticipated 
time should have already captured the effect of education on reducing the 
expected time required for market activity.  But those who are better educated 
might both find the process psychologically easier (a factor not reflected in 
other variables), and be more confident in their estimates, and so be more 
likely to search and switch.   
 
Respondents were also asked whether they thought it important to trust their 
supplier in each market, to reflect potential quality concerns.  The correct 
response to the water market question,  that there is no choice of supplier, was 
used as a proxy for general knowledge of markets and labelled ‘savvy’.   
 
We analyse each household and market as an individual observation, i.e. we 
regard our data as a panel (I x K) across households (I) and products (K).  
Each such household/market observation was included only if all the relevant 
variables described above were known for that case.  We explore the effect of 
this selection process after presenting the results in the next section.   
 
Tables 1 to 4 present descriptive statistics for the whole sample.   
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 956 respondents (almost half the sample) either refused or responded ‘don’t know’ to the question on 
income. 
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Table 1: Levels of Awareness of Choice and Experience of Search and 
Switching  
Market No. responsible Aware % Searched % Switched % 
Electricity 1,605       1,476  92 439 27 370 23 
Mobile phone 1,670       1,595  96 458 27 370 22 
Fixed phone line 1,512       1,312  87 196 13 121 8 
National/overseas 
calls 1,410       1,247  88 232 16 172 12 
Broadband 
internet 889         797  90 136 15 90 10 
Car insurance 1,202       1,139  95 409 34 304 25 
Mortgage 840         786  94 139 17 84 10 
Current bank 
account 1,759       1,683  96 125 7 74 4 
Average across markets 
 92  20  14 
Those who are aware, searched and switched are each shown as a percentage of all market 
participants (including those who are unaware of choice). 
 
 
Table 2: Average Expected Savings from Searching and Switching (£ per 
month)  
 
Market number Exp max gains  Std. dev. Reported Expected gains 
  
     average bill /average bill 
Electricity 518 7.74 10.40 35.82 0.22 
Mobile phone 601 7.99 11.17 25.69 0.31 
Fixed phone line 420 6.03 8.12 22.27 0.27 
National/overseas calls 352 6.60 8.71 19.30 0.34 
Broadband internet 218 5.69 6.92 19.63 0.29 
Car insurance 392 11.97 16.42 53.90 0.22 
Mortgage 196 37.89 43.60 427.89 0.09 
Current bank account 302 3.66 9.81 7.32 0.50 
Average across markets   9.38 12.68  0.28 
 
Consumers expect greatest potential gains from switching in the mortgage 
market in absolute terms, though these are the lowest as a proportion of 
average spend.  In terms of proportionate gains, respondents perceive the 
greatest potential gain from switching current bank accounts.  However a 
majority of consumers responded that they did not know how much they could 
gain by shopping around, reducing the sample available for analysis; the 
implications for interpreting the model results are discussed in section 5. 
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Table 3: Average Expected Search and Switch Time for Each Market (hours) 
 
Market Expected search time Expected switch time 
  obs Average Std. dev obs Average Std. dev 
Electricity 1567 7.30 15.98 1567 8.31 17.88 
Mobile phone 1653 5.39 13.26 1662 4.18 11.77 
Fixed phone line 1522 6.09 15.11 1551 5.46 14.34 
National/overseas calls 1608 4.47 12.70 1621 4.70 13.44 
Broadband internet 1884 1.86 8.32 1872 2.22 9.72 
Car insurance 1783 3.91 11.79 1775 2.42 9.32 
Mortgage 1859 4.52 13.92 1853 4.85 14.66 
Current bank account 1539 9.04 17.83 1543 10.41 19.62 
Average across markets   5.19 13.87  5.18 14.31 
 
The large standard deviations of the mean values for expected costs indicate 
wide variations in the time which respondents expect it will take them to search 
and switch. Even though the time which different consumers actually take to 
switch suppliers might be quite similar, particularly for groups using the same 
methods (for example web based comparison services), the important issue 
for our analysis is respondents’ prior expectations. These differ quite widely 
even if the realisation of the costs would not do so in practice. The summary 
statistics of all variables across markets is shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
 
5. Results 
The parsimonious results from the consumer utility model are shown in Table 
5.  Because anticipated search and switching costs were closely correlated (R2 
= 0.66) we were unable to use them together in the search equation as 
indicated in equation (1) above.  Because search costs are more immediately 
relevant to the search decision, we have included these in the first stage 
equation.   
 
Variables  Obs   Mean  
 Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
Cost and benefit measure      
Expected max gain 
 (exgainmax: £/month) 
    
2,999  
    
9.381  
  
17.18
5  0 300 
Expected search time 
 (exsetime:  hours) 
  
13,415  
    
5.187  
  
13.86
9  0 112 
Expected switch time  
(exswtime: hours) 
  
13,444  
    
5.175  
  
14.31
4  0 64 
Demographic variables      
Age (age: age/100) 
  
16,216  
    
0.434  
    
0.175  0.15 0.99 
Age squared (agesq: 
age^2/10000) 
  
16,216  
    
0.219  
    
0.170  0.0225 0.9801 
Gender (gender: 1=male; 
0=fem) 
  
16,216  
    
0.469  
    
0.499  0 1 
Education (eduyr: in years) 
  
16,216  
  
12.689  
    
2.475  11 20 
Attitudes      
Savvy (savvy: 1=yes; 0=no) 
  
16,216  
    
0.395  
    
0.489  0 1 
Current supplier will not 
match the best deal  
(relucmat:1=yes; 0=no) 
  
16,216  
    
0.089  
    
0.285  0 1 
Trust is important for choice 
of supplier  (trust: 1=yes; 
0=no) 
  
16,216  
    
0.411  
    
0.492  0 1 
Behaviour      
Switched in other markets 
 (swother: 1=yes; 0=no) 
  
16,216  
    
0.398  
    
0.489  0 1 
The number of observation is for the panel (I x K) of individuals (i) across markets (k). 
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Table 5: Determinants of Search and Switching (default market electricity) 
 
N.B. *,**,*** t-values significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively 
           ‡Chi2 -value significant at the 0.1% level.   
 Dependent variables 
 
(1) 
Search 
  
(2) Switch 
 
MFX (dy/dx) 
Pr(seyes=1,swyes=1) 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Z Coef. Std. Err. Z =y=0.2126 
Exgainmax (£/month) -0.0095 0.0051 -1.85* 0.0023 0.0024 0.96 -0.0004 
Exsetime (hours) -0.0027 0.0014 -1.94*    -0.0002* 
Exswtime (hours)    -0.0032 0.0015 -2.18** -0.0007** 
Demographic 
variables 
       
Age (age/100) -2.9167 1.0386 -2.81*** -2.9423 1.0465 -2.81*** -0.8722*** 
Agesq  1.8769 1.1263 1.67* 2.6441 1.1511 2.30** 0.7159*** 
Gender (1=male; 0=fem) -0.1494 0.0827 -1.81* -0.2926 0.1163 -2.52*** -0.0740*** 
Education (in years)  -0.0004 0.0170 -0.03 -0.0192 0.0191 -1.01 -0.0040 
Savvy (1=yes; 0=no) -0.1398 0.0790 -1.77* -0.1107 0.0952 -1.16 -0.0352 
Trust important 
(1=y;0=n) 0.1313 0.0613 2.14** -0.0308 0.1143 -0.27 0.0064 
-0.3157 0.3026 -1.04 0.0694 0.3245 0.21 -0.0146 Switched in other 
markets (1=yes; 0=no)         
Market dummies 
       
Mobile phone 0.1247 0.0878 1.42 0.1052 0.0913 1.15 0.0338 
Fixed phone line 
-0.3979 0.1035 -3.85*** -0.5770 0.1115 -5.18*** -0.1304*** 
National/overseas call 
-0.2863 0.1070 -2.68*** -0.3184 0.1120 -2.84*** -0.0824*** 
Broadband internet 
-0.2787 0.1194 -2.33** -0.3357 0.1265 -2.65*** -0.0840*** 
Car insurance 0.4918 0.0961 5.12*** 0.2149 0.0981 2.19** 0.0908*** 
Mortgage 
-0.2819 0.1370 -2.06** -0.2684 0.1633 -1.64* -0.0730** 
Current Bank Account 
-0.9397 0.1311 -7.17*** -1.0781 0.1481 -7.28*** -0.2033*** 
Interaction terms 
       
Exgainmax*mortgage    -0.0057 0.0034 -1.69* -0.0012* 
Exgainmax*age  0.0293 0.0128 2.29**    0.0027** 
Savvy*swother 0.3326 0.0945 3.52***    0.0257*** 
Swother*gender 0.3569 0.1118 3.19*** 0.1963 0.1181 1.66* 0.0751** 
Swother*education 0.0483 0.0221 2.19* 0.0546 0.0237 2.30** 0.0157*** 
Savvy*trust    0.1729 0.1049 1.65* 0.0352* 
Swother*trust    -0.1292 0.1049 -1.23 -0.0267 
Trust*gender    0.2302 0.1019 2.26** 0.0468** 
Constant 0.3248 0.3210 1.01 0.1849 0.3434 0.54  
No of obs. 2388   Log-likelihood -2256.195  
rho 0.8412   Wald Chi2(43) 443.29‡  
    McFadden's LRI 0.145  
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The results provide some support for the hypothesis that consumers’ search 
and switching behaviour reflects an underlying model of utility maximisation.  
Activity is less likely if the expected time spent searching and, particularly, 
switching is higher. But even the latter effect is small: a one hour increase in 
expected time (a fifth of the average anticipated by consumers for switching) 
reduces the probability of activity by only seven in ten thousand. The gain 
anticipated from changing supplier is influential only for older respondents, and 
its average effect is also small – around 0.9% increase in probability for an 
extra expected savings of a pound per month (around a ninth of the average 
gains anticipated).7 
 
The number of years spent in education which, as a proxy for income, might 
be expected to affect the valuation both of anticipated time and of gains, does 
not influence activity directly, nor interaction with either of the estimates of time 
commitment needed.   Its only influence is in increasing the probability of 
switching amongst those who have switched in other markets.  Such 
experience also increases the probability of switching amongst those who 
know that there is no choice of water supplier.  Those who are better 
educated, have experience of switching and are ‘savvy’ about water supply are 
likely to be more sure of their estimates of both gain and potential costs in 
searching for better deals, indicating that the confidence with which a 
consumer provides such estimates is as influential in the decision whether to 
search and switch as are the values of the central estimates alone.   
 
Age affects the probability of switching, independently of its interaction with 
expected gains.  .  The young and old are more likely to be active, with the 
least activity likely in the mid to late fifties, increasing after retirement age.  The 
U-shaped age pattern for market activity is very similar to that reported in 
Giulietti et al (2005), Pomp et al (2005) and Sturluson (2002).   Amongst 
consumers who do not think it important to trust suppliers and have not 
switched in other markets, women are around 5% more likely to be active than 
men, consistent with Sturluson’s (2002) result; but the situation is reversed if 
trust of supplier is important and there is experience of switching, confirming 
the findings of Moshkin and Shachar (2002), who suggest that women have 
significantly higher switching costs.   
 
The importance of trusting suppliers in particular markets was introduced to 
capture concerns about quality, which might deter consumers from switching 
even if they believed that there were financial benefits from doing so.  Its only 
influence is on consumers who are knowledgeable about the water industry, 
when it increases the probability of activity by around 4%, perhaps because 
these consumers are also confident in which suppliers they are able to trust. 
 
Even allowing for the different expectations, attitudes, characteristics and 
experience of consumers, the probability of switching varies substantially 
between markets.  Consumers are more likely to be active in the car insurance 
market than in the reference market, electricity; and less likely to search and 
                                                 
7
 In the mortgage market higher expected gains alone seem to exert a very small negative effect on the 
probability of switching, but this effect disappears if 3 outliers (non searchers who estimated very high 
potential gains) are removed.   
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switch in all other markets except mobile phones.  The market effects are 
large, raising the probability of activity by 9% in the car insurance market, and 
lowering it by 20% for current bank accounts.  These market dummies do not 
merely reflect the difference in activity rates between markets, as shown by the 
descriptive statistics in Table 1.  The additional activity predicted by the model 
in Table 5 for car insurance relative to electricity is much greater than the raw 
comparisons suggest; while the difference which the model predicts between 
activity in the mortgage and electricity markets is less than the relative 
proportions described in Table 1 would suggest.   
 
Table 5 enables us to identify how each factor affects not only consumers’ 
overall activity, but to distinguish their influence on each of their search and 
switching decisions.  While similar factors affect the decisions to search and to 
switch, their influence on the two activities is not always identical.  Expected 
gain (with age) is more likely to stimulate searching than switching; Expecting 
to spend an extra hour switching appears to have a greater deterrent effect 
than searching, but these marginal effects are not statistically significantly 
different from each other.   
 
The U-shaped effect of age is similar for both search and switching.  
Experience of switching supplier in other markets increases the likelihood of 
search more than that of switching.  Its influence on the decision to search 
equation is particularly interesting in the light of its use in other studies as a 
proxy for search costs themselves.  Giulietti et al. (2005), who had no direct 
measure of expected costs, interpret experience as lowering search costs.  
Our results confirm that experience affects the probability of search more than 
that of switching.  But since we have a direct measure of expected search time 
we are able to interpret the importance of experience of activity in other 
markets as increasing the confidence which consumers place in their central 
estimates rather than affecting those estimates directly.   
 
5.1 Assessment of Results 
Estimations of the model were made, selectively identifying the best use of 
household variables by comparing the likelihood ratios and the goodness of 
the fit measured by the McFadden’s likelihood ratio index (LRI) as well as the 
AIC reported in Table A2. Goodness of fit, although relatively low, is 
comparable to similar studies (Giulietti et al, 2005). All our results show a high 
positive correlation between the residuals of the two paired equations with the 
rho coefficients around 0.84, as expected, indicating that both search and 
switching costs are co-dependent on variables omitted from our analysis.   
 
To obtain usable estimates of relevant variables, the observations for this 
analysis are restricted to a sub sample of the consumers and markets included 
in the original sample.  One obstacle was the high non response rates to the 
question on expected gains.  This raises concerns that the sample is biased, 
because those who have been active in the market are more likely to be able 
to estimate these gains.  Using non response to this question as a dummy 
variable we confirmed that those who had searched and switched were indeed 
more likely to have responded and so be included in our sample.  Overall our 
model predicts the probability of market activity as 21%, compared with 14% of 
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the entire sample who had searched and switched.  While the sample is partial 
in this respect, the retention of 80% of consumers who have not switched in 
the last three years provides useful comparative information for the model.  It 
is not clear that this partiality induces consistent bias. 
 
For the observations included in the analysis we were concerned about 
potential endogeneity.  Those who have searched and switched have a 
consistently more accurate estimate of search and switching time and potential 
gains. To test for this possibility we compared the expectations across 
customers who were active and inactive in each market (Table A4 in 
appendix).  We found that consumers who had switched or searched provided 
lower estimates for both anticipated gains and expected search and switch 
time than their inactive counterparts.  This provides some comfort that any 
endogeneity operates in opposite directions; if the searchers/switchers have 
knowledge of ‘true’ values, inactive customers are underestimating both the 
positive and negative aspects.  
 
The confidence with which consumers estimate potential gains and costs 
exerts a positive effect on search and switching.  Our model suggests that 
variables which would increase confidence (switching in other markets, 
knowledge about the water industry, level of education) are important in 
predicting increased market activity.   The effect of experience in other markets 
on expectations is particularly interesting.  Those who have switched 
elsewhere predict higher levels of search and switching time, and of gains, so 
the influence of experience does not seem to be through these central 
estimates. Rather this provides support for the role of previous switching in 
providing confidence for each consumers’ predictions, and the positive effect 
that this has on activity.  Confidence may also be a factor in the market 
differences, where greater certainty in some markets might reflect advertising 
or information campaigns.  The inclusion of these other variables, which are 
designed to capture consumers’ confidence in their estimates and which result 
from switching in other markets, should alleviate the endogeneity problem 
somewhat.   
 
For all these reasons the results should be interpreted as a general indication 
of which factors affect consumer activities, and the direction of their influence, 
rather than as precise measures of individual coefficients or marginal effects.  
Despite these ‘caveats’, the model is sufficiently robust to indicate that 
consumer activity within this sample seems to be explained well by a model 
based on conventional maximisation of consumer utility.  However the process 
is clearly more complex than a ‘straight’ trade-off between expected costs and 
benefits, and activity in the market depends on many aspects of consumers’ 
characteristics and experience beyond a pure monetary model. Some are 
demonstrated in the variables included in the model; and the high value of rho 
demonstrates that many factors common to search and switching have been 
omitted. 
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6. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
This is the first study of which we are aware in which consumers’ own 
estimates of potential gains and time expenditure have been used as potential 
determinants of their activity in the market.  Most previous studies have used 
extrinsic estimates of the gains available to consumers, and demographic 
variables as proxies for the search and switching costs which would be 
incurred.  One advantage of our approach is that we are able to separate the 
effect of demographic and other characteristics as direct influences from their 
role as representatives of the time which consumers expect to spend 
searching and switching.  
 
Consumers’ decisions to become active in a market can be partially explained 
by a model of utility maximisation.  This provides some justification for the 
optimism of Competition Authorities in imposing information remedies.  Those 
who had switched had higher estimates (with greater variation between 
consumers) for both search and switching costs: inactivity is not due to 
overestimates of the time taken in either search or switching.  They also had 
higher estimates (and higher inter-consumer variance) for anticipated gains.  
So inactive consumers might be motivated by greater potential rewards, 
though the effect of increasing the mean expectation would be very small.   
 
However the influence of a consumer’s expected gains and costs, even when 
these are directly measured, provide only a small part of the explanation for 
the probability that they will be active in a market.  The confidence with which 
consumers predict their likely gains and costs seem to be much more 
influential in determining whether or not they will switch.  Such motivation is 
consistent with the wish to reduce their ‘regret’ in switching decisions.   As in 
previous studies we find that experience of switching in other markets exerts a 
major and positive influence, which we are able to interpret as reducing the 
variation of a consumer’s estimate, rather than affecting its central value.  To 
encourage activity in any one market, competition authorities need to provide 
consumers with good information, of which consumers are confident, about the 
likely costs and benefits.  This will provide positive externalities for other 
markets, building further confidence through experience.   
 
Other positive influences on switching include knowledge about which markets 
are competitive and level of education, indicating the importance of good 
general education about consumer matters and opportunities.  Authorities who 
wish to punish inappropriate firm behaviour by publicising bad experiences of 
switching through a ‘name and shame’ process may face a conundrum, if such 
publicity lowers consumer confidence and deters market activity.  While age 
and gender both influence activity, there are no obvious lessons for targeting 
information or other campaigns at particular demographic groups.   
 
The significant and substantial differences between markets do suggest 
differential approaches.  All the markets included in this study are subject to 
sector regulation: from the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (electricity); 
the Office of Telecommunications (mobile and fixed line phone services and 
broadband); or from the Financial Services Authority (car insurance, 
mortgages and bank accounts).   The greatest propensity to switch is in the car 
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insurance market, though the influence of anticipated savings from switching is 
particularly small in this market.  Car insurance is the only market in our 
sample where annual reminders for renewal are required, even if the 
consumer need take no action to stay with the current supplier.  Such 
reminders seem to prompt some consumer activity, and some competitors 
target advertising at the time of contract renewal.  Regulators might wish to 
consider imposing similar reminders in other markets, though they would need 
to balance potential gains against the cost of the exercise.   The greater 
influence of savings on activity in mobile phones may indicate response to high 
profile advertising, a function more appropriate for firms than authorities.  The 
reduced probability of activity for fixed line products and in current bank 
accounts, compared with electricity, confirms that the lower level of switching 
in these markets is not explained by differences in the expected gains or costs, 
or in the other personal characteristics and experience variables included in 
the regression; consumers are more reluctant to be active in these markets, 
regardless of these factors.  To increase activity here, authorities need to 
explore further the particular features of these markets which render searching 
and switching less attractive.  In contrast, the lower level of switching for 
mortgages and broadband (well under half that reported for electricity) are 
explained by the expected gains and costs and other factors, rather than by 
differences in the markets themselves.  In this case, any remedial action would 
be less effectively targeted to market based campaigns unless they specifically 
affected these other factors.  
 
In terms of addressing the search and switch activities directly, there is weak 
evidence that consumers may be more deterred by switching than by search 
costs, but the difference is not statistically significant.  The factors affecting 
each decision are broadly similar, so there is no clear indication that market 
activity would be improved by targeting one process rather than the other.  
Remedies to increase knowledge and confidence, as identified above, should 
address both the search and the switching processes. 
 
We conclude that while a model of utility maximisation provides some 
explanation of consumers’ market activity, the influence of expected gains and 
time involved is relatively small.  Many other factors, in particular the 
confidence with which consumers hold their estimates of gains and costs, are 
important influences. And much remains unexplained, suggesting that 
consumers both maximise utility and display ‘behavioural’ characteristics in 
deciding whether to search for better deals and switch providers.  The use of 
informational remedies by competition Authorities does not seem misplaced.  
The importance of consumer confidence, the role of other factors and the 
differences between markets indicate the need to tailor action carefully to each 
situation.   
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Appendix:  
 
Questions asked in survey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q1. In your area, do you have choice of more than one provider for the 
following products?  READ OUT 
 
 
 
Q2. SHOWCARD B Which of the following does your household currently 
have and pay for?  
 
 
 
 
Q4. SHOWCARD C  Using the words on this card, how important or 
unimportant is it to you to trust your provider for the following 
products?   
 
   
Very 
im-
portant 
Fairly 
im-
portant 
Neither 
im-
portant 
nor 
unim-
portant 
Fairly 
unim-
portant 
Very 
unim-
portant 
Don’t 
know 
 
 
 
Q5. Have you looked around for a new provider for any of the following 
products at any time in the last three years, that is, since May 2002?  
 
 
 
 
Q11
. 
Apart from when moving home, have you switched provider of any of 
these products in the last three years, that is, since May 2002?  READ 
OUT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASK ALL SWITCHED ANY 
Q15
. 
Please tell me how much time you spent searching around and 
looking for the necessary information before you switched each 
relevant product area? 
 
 
  
No 
time at 
all 
Up to 
an 
hour 
1 to 3 
hours 
4 to 8 
hours 
About 
1 day 
2 to 3 
days 
4 to 6 
days 
A 
week 
or 
more 
Don’t 
know 
 
IF ANY TIME SPENT SEARCHING AT Q15  
Q17
. 
Would you say it took more time than expected, less time than expected 
or as long as you expected to search for information on ….? 
 
   
More 
time than 
expected 
As 
expected 
Less time 
than 
expected 
Don’t 
know 
  
 
ASK ALL SWITCHED ANY 
Q23
. 
How much of your own time did it take to switch PRODUCT AREA 
after you made a decision?  
 
QA. Firstly, could you tell me if you are involved solely, jointly or not at all in the decision 
of which supplier to use for any of these services or products? 
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No time 
at all 
Up to an 
hour 
1 to 3 
hours 
4 to 8 
hours 
About 1 
day 
2 to 3 
days 
4 to 6 
days 
A week 
or more 
Don’t 
know 
 
ASK ALL NOT SWITCHED BUT SEARCHED IN ANY AREA (Q27) 
Q29
. 
How much time did it take you to search for the necessary 
information on …?  
 
 
  
No time 
at all 
Up to an 
hour 
1 to 3 
hours 
4 to 8 
hours 
About 1 
day 
2 to 3 
days 
4 to 6 
days 
A week 
or more 
Don’t 
know 
 
ASK ALL NOT SWITCHED BUT SEARCHED IN ANY AREA 
Q33
. 
How long do you think it would have taken of your own time to 
switch once you had all the necessary information for switching  
 
  
No time 
at all 
Up to an 
hour 
1 to 3 
hours 
4 to 8 
hours 
About 1 
day 
2 to 3 
days 
4 to 6 
days 
A week 
or more 
Don’t 
know 
 
  
ASK ALL NON-SWITCHERS WHO HAVE NOT SEARCHED 
Q35
. 
How much of your own time did you think it would take you to find 
enough information to decide whether and to whom to switch  
 
  
No time 
at all 
Up to an 
hour 
1 to 3 
hours 
4 to 8 
hours 
About 1 
day 
2 to 3 
days 
4 to 6 
days 
A week 
or more 
Don’t 
know 
 
ASK ALL NON-SWITCHERS WHO HAVE NOT SEARCHED 
Q36
. 
Once you have found all the necessary information to choose a new 
supplier, how much of your own time do you think it would take to 
switch  
 
  
No time 
at all 
Up to an 
hour 
1 to 3 
hours 
4 to 8 
hours 
About 1 
day 
2 to 3 
days 
4 to 6 
days 
A week 
or more 
Don’t 
know 
  
 
ASK ALL RELEVANT 
Q46
. 
How much is the most you think you could save per month if you shopped around  
for. . . ?  READ OUT PRODUCT AREAS 
 
 
 
 
 
Construction of expected time spent searching and switching 
 
The expected search time (exsetime) and the expected switching time 
(exswtime) are constructed from different questions for different consumer 
groups according to the table below.  Table A4 below compares the expected 
search and switch times for active and inactive consumers. 
 
Table A1: Construction of Expected Search and Switching Time 
Consumer 
group 
time spent 
searching? 
more or 
less than 
expected? 
expected 
search time 
ex ante? 
  
switching 
time ex 
post? 
expected 
switching 
time ex 
ante? 
Searched & 
switched Q15 Q17 
Adjusted 
Q15 by one 
scale down 
or up 
according to 
Q17. 
Q23  
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Searched 
but  
not 
switched  
Q29    Q33 
Not 
searched  
nor 
switched 
  Q35  Q36 
Not 
searched 
(Q15=0) 
and 
switched 
0 from Q15 Q17 
Adjusted, but 
not 
downwards  
Q23  
 
 
Table A2: The Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) for Model Selection 
 
  Log Likelihood  # of parameters Sample size AIC 
Full base model (M0) -2218.8731 126 2388 1.9647 
Reduced model 1: dropped all  
insignificant interaction terms (p>0.1) (M1) -2254.1950 44 2388 1.9256 
Reduced model 2: dropped all 
 insignificant interaction terms  (p>0.1) (M2) -2259.0816 40 2388 1.9264 
 
The above table summarises the model selection process by a general-to-
specific approach. The AIC figures suggest the model M1 is the best fit 
amongst the various models reduced from the full base model (M0). The 
reduced models M1 and M2 were constructed by dropping statistically 
insignificant variables. Dropping a variable(s) in this way allows identification of 
the trade-off between the Log-likelihood ratio and the number of. The 
turnaround in the AIC between the models M1 and M2 indicate that further 
reduction is not beneficial.  
 
Table A3: The Interaction Terms Used in the Full Base Model 
  
exgainm
ax 
exseti
me 
exswti
me 
ag
e 
gend
er 
ed
u 
sav
vy 
tru
st 
Demographic         
Age x x x      
Gender x x x      
Edu x x x      
Attitudes         
Savvy x x x x x x   
Trust x x x x x x x  
Behaviour         
Swother x x x x x x x x 
Market         
Electricity x x x      
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Mobile x x x      
Fixed phone  x x x      
Nat'l/ovreseas call 
rates x x x      
Broadband 
internet x x x      
Car insurance x x x      
Mortgage x x x      
Current bank 
account x x x           
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 Table A4: Expectation Differences Between Active and Inactive Consumers 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Err. Obs Mean Std. Err. t-test d.f.
Searched
Expected maximum gain 980        11.035   0.586     2,019         8.579     0.368     -3.6781*** 2997
          (exgainmax: £ per month)
Expected search time 1,959     9.659     0.396     11,456       4.422     0.121     -15.5839*** 13413
          (exsetime: in hours)
Expected switch time 1,964     7.699     0.368     11,480       4.743     0.130     -8.4789*** 13442
          (exswtime: in hours)
Switched 
Expected maximum gain 717        10.714   0.566     2,282         8.963     0.372     -2.3822*** 2997
          (exgainmax: £ per month)
Expected search time 1,510     9.523     0.443     11,905       4.637     0.443     -12.9783*** 13413
          (exsetime: in hours)
Expected switch time 1,536     6.849     0.394     11,908       4.959     0.130     -4.8754*** 13442
          (exswtime: in hours)
N.B.:
1. The number of observation is for the panel (I x K) of individuals (i) across markets (k).
2. The mean difference t-tests were conducted for the base variables without interaction terms. 
3. *,**,*** t-values significant at the 5%, 2.5%, and 1% levels respectively.
(1) Yes (2) No Mean difference 
 
 
Table A4 shows that there are differences in the expectation of gains and 
costs between active and inactive consumers (e.g. searchers vs. non-
searchers), with inactive consumers estimating lower expected gains and 
costs.  
 
 
 
